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Introduction/Abstract 
 
One of David Rosenthal’s many important contributions to the philosophy of 
mind was his clear and unshirking account of introspection. Here we argue that 
while there is a kind of introspection (we call it “reflective introspection”) that 
Rosenthal’s account may be structurally fit to accommodate, there is also a 
second kind (“primitive introspection”) that his account cannot recover. We 
introduce Rosenthal’s account of introspection in §1, present the case for the 
psychological reality of primitive introspection in §2, and argue that Rosenthal’s 
account lacks the resources to accommodate it in §3.  
 
1. Introspection as Third-Order Thought: Rosenthal’s Account  
 
1985 was a long time ago. Reagan was sworn in for a second term after winning 
97.6% of the electoral vote. The internet’s domain name system was established. 
In early July, Back to the Future hit the theaters across the US. A few days later, 
on 8 July 1985, an article landed in the offices of Philosophical Studies in 
Tucson, Arizona, titled ‘Two Concepts of Consciousness.’ The plucky young 
author, one David M. Rosenthal, opened it thus: 
No mental phenomenon is more central than consciousness to an adequate 
understanding of the mind. Nor does any mental phenomenon seem more 
stubbornly to resist theoretical treatment. (Rosenthal 1986: 329) 
He went on to develop what is arguably the first clear and precise account of the 
nature of consciousness and introspection in analytic philosophy of mind. 
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Rosenthal’s “higher-order thought” theory of consciousness proceeded to exert 
immense influence on, and attract constant discussion in, contemporary 
philosophy of consciousness. Here we want to focus on Rosenthal’s theory of 
introspection, which is no less clear and precise but has received less attention. 
Rosenthal’s theory of introspection does flow seamlessly from his theory of 
consciousness, though, so we start our discussion with the latter.  
 Rosenthal’s theory of consciousness can be seen as a combination of two 
parts: (i) a fundamental principle, intuitive and pre-theoretically compelling, that 
operates as a kind of datum, and (ii) a theoretical edifice erected around this 
datum and designed to do justice to it while respecting a diverse collection of 
desiderata and (both a priori and a posteriori) plausibility considerations.  
 The fundamental principle is Rosenthal’s so-called transitivity principle, 
which was later to become a central decision point for all major philosophical 
theories of consciousness. The principle is simple: Conscious states are states 
we are aware of. Unconscious mental states may occur in us without our having 
any inkling that they do, but a conscious state is different – we are “to some 
degree aware of being in it” (Rosenthal 1986: 334). The principle is 
straightforward, but it turns out that, combined with a series of independently 
plausible considerations, it generates a rather comprehensive and textured 
characterization of the nature of consciousness. Suppose S has a conscious 
desire for pistachio gelato while S* has an unconscious desire for pistachio 
gelato. What does the psychological difference between S and S* amount to 
exactly? Crushing some subtleties, Rosenthal’s answer may be summarized as 
follows: S’s desire is, whereas S*’s is not, the object of a non-inferential higher-
order thought. In other words, what makes a mental state conscious is that its 
subject also has another mental state that represents it, where that other mental 
state is a non-inferential higher-order thought.  
Importantly, in Rosenthal’s theory this higher-order thought does not do 
anything to the lower-order state in order to make it conscious. It does not bring 
about any intrinsic change in that state that renders that state conscious. 
Rather, the higher-order thought makes the lower-order state conscious simply 
by being there. It is in this sense that consciousness is, in Rosenthal’s theory, a 
relational rather than intrinsic property of conscious states (1986: 354). A 
mental state becoming conscious is, in this framework, a Cambridge change (the 
kind of change one undergoes, e.g., when one becomes an uncle). We can have 
two intrinsically indistinguishable mental states only one of which is conscious, 
namely, if only one of them happens to occur at the same time as some suitable 
higher-order thought. This point is quite crucial to Rosenthal’s theory’s reductive 
ambitions, its attempt to account for the nature of consciousness in terms of the 
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coming-together of elements none of which is conscious on its own. If the higher-
order thought needed to in any way change the lower-order state to make it 
conscious, then the lower-order state’s consciousness would consist in whatever 
intrinsic modification would be thereby effected, and the nature of consciousness 
would be identical with the nature of this intrinsic modification. The higher-
order thought’s role with respect to consciousness would only be to causal, not 
constitutive—that is, it would concern what makes consciousness occur, not 
what consciousness is. But it is only by giving the higher-order thought a 
constitutive role in consciousness, offering an account of what consciousness is, 
that Rosenthal can make good on his promise to “get underneath” consciousness 
and reductively account for it in terms of the coming-together of non-conscious 
elements. 
How, then, does Rosenthal reach his reductive theory of consciousness, 
whereby a mental state is conscious just when it co-occurs with a non-
inferential higher-order thought about it, from the fundamental principle that 
conscious states are states we are aware of? The answer is that he obtains it by 
conjoining the principle with three independent considerations, which we will 
now briefly expound.  
 1. Assuming, then, that when S has a conscious desire for pistachio gelato, 
the desire is conscious because S is aware of it, why should we construe S’s 
awareness of her desire as a thought? Well, it is surely not a desire, since 
unfortunately we are often in conscious states we wish we were not in. Thus, S 
may be on a diet and may wish she did not want gelato so often. But nor is S’s 
awareness of her desire a perception (as “higher-order perception theories” 
suggest), since perception is produced by sense organs, and there is no organ of 
inner awareness. We can see this by considering that the external senses are 
associated with distinctive qualities (visual, auditory, etc.), whereas our 
awareness of our conscious states is associated with no distinctive qualities 
(Rosenthal 1990: 740). (Could this awareness still be “quasi-perceptual”? It 
depends on what we mean by this, but according to Rosenthal, as long as there 
are no sensory qualities associated with awareness of conscious states, any 
analogy to perception would be “idle” – Ibid.) If S’s awareness of her desire for 
gelato is neither a desire nor a (quasi-)perception, then plausibly it is just a 
thought.  
 2. Why is S’s thought about her desire higher-order? The alternative to a 
conscious state being the object of a higher-order thought is that it be its own 
object (as “self-representational” theories claim). According to this alternative, S’s 
desire and her thought about her desire are one and the same mental state. But, 
claims Rosenthal (1990: 746-7), mental states individuate by content and 
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attitude, and a desire with the content <I eat pistachio gelato> differs both in 
content and in attitude from a thought with the content <I desire that I eat 
pistachio gelato>. Since they differ both in content and in attitude, concludes 
Rosenthal, they must be distinct mental states. 
 3. Why must S’s higher-order thought be non-inferential? That is, why is it 
indispensable that S’s thought that she desires pistachio gelato not be formed on 
the basis of conscious inference? The basic reason is that allowing the higher-
order thought to be formed by conscious inference would produce an 
extensionally inadequate theory. One can perfectly well infer from one’s behavior, 
or from another’s testimony, that one is in some unconscious mental state 
(Rosenthal 1990: 737). But there is also a deep reason for this extensional 
inadequacy: the kind of awareness of our mental states that makes them 
conscious is an immediate awareness – so it cannot be mediated by conscious 
inference (Rosenthal 1986: 335-6, 1993).  
 There is a fourth characteristic Rosenthal ascribed to consciousness-making 
higher-order thoughts: although they confer consciousness on their objects, 
typically they themselves are unconscious. The reason for this is straightforward: 
if the higher-order thought about the desire for gelato were itself conscious, then 
by the theory’s own lights, it would have to be the object of a third-order thought, 
and we would soon be off on a vicious regress.  
 Nonetheless, claimed Rosenthal, it is psychologically possible for us to have 
conscious second-order thoughts accompanied (and made conscious) by 
unconscious third-order thoughts about them. In fact, this is exactly what 
introspecting amounts to (Rosenthal 1986: 353-4). Introspection is often 
construed as a matter of entering a second-order state that represents one’s 
current conscious experience. But within Rosenthal’s theory of consciousness, 
the subject is in this kind of second-order state whenever she is in a conscious 
state, regardless of whether she is introspecting her conscious state or not. 
Accordingly, for Rosenthal the transition from being in a non-introspected 
conscious state to introspecting that state is rather a matter of transitioning 
from being in an unconscious second-order thought to a conscious one. Given 
Rosenthal’s theory of what makes a mental state conscious, this means that the 
introspecting subject is the subject who (non-inferentially) enters a third-order 
state, namely, a(n unconscious) thought about her second-order thought. Thus 
to be introspectively aware of desiring gelato is to be in three simultaneous but 
distinct mental states: a conscious first-order desire with a content roughly like 
<I eat gelato>, a conscious second-order thought with a content roughly like <I 
desire that I eat gelato>, and an unconscious third-order thought with a content 
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roughly like <I think that I desire that I eat gelato>. Call this the “Third-Order 
Thought model of introspection.” 
Here we can see how Rosenthal’s theory of introspection flows directly from 
his theory of consciousness. If the basic “datum” for the theory of consciousness 
is that conscious states are states we are aware of, the corresponding datum for 
the theory of introspection is that introspected conscious states are states we are 
consciously aware of: we have not just any non-inferential higher-order thought 
about them, but a conscious one. By then reapplying the account of what makes 
a first-order state conscious to the case of second-order states, we obtain a 
theory of introspection.  
Naturally, here too the third-order thought does not do anything to the 
second-order thought it is about. It does not render the second-order state 
conscious by bringing about any intrinsic change in it. Rather, the third-order 
thought makes it the case that the second-order thought is conscious, hence 
that the subject is in an introspective state, merely by being there. Introspection 
is relational, then, in the same way consciousness is. This is only to be expected, 
since in this framework introspection is a matter of transitioning from an 
unconscious to a conscious second-order thought. 
(Are there cases involving a conscious third-order thought, made conscious 
by an unconscious fourth-order thought? It depends on what the contingent, 
empirical laws of psychology permit. The higher-order theory need not take a 
stand on this. If this kind of “second-order introspection” is part of our 
psychological repertoire, then the theory would model it in terms of a hierarchy 
of four simultaneous mental states. But if second-order introspection is not in 
the cards for us, then there is nothing for the theory to model.) 
Note that although a subject being in an introspective state involves, in 
Rosenthal’s theory, a three-tier structure with three distinct states, the 
introspective state proper is only the second-order state. The first-order state is 
rather the introspected state, while the third-order state is the state that makes 
the introspective state conscious. Accordingly, it is the properties of the second-
order state in this three-tier structure that are the properties of the introspective 
state in Rosenthal’s theory.  
The property we will focus on in what follows is that of being a thought. It is 
a feature of Rosenthal’s theory that all introspective states are thoughts. For an 
introspective state just is the state that renders the first-order state conscious 
when it itself becomes conscious, and the states that render first-order states 
conscious are always, in Rosenthal’s theory, thoughts. What does it mean to say 
that they are thoughts? It means, at a minimum, that they have the kind of 
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content that thoughts have and take the kind of attitude toward that content 
that thoughts take. The content that thoughts have is conceptual content with 
propositional structure, that is, a proposition the constituents of which are 
concepts. The attitude thoughts take toward this sort of content is a belief-like 
attitude with a mind-to-world direction of fit, what Rosenthal calls “assertoric 
force” (Rosenthal 1986: 346-7, 1990: 742.) Thus, S’s introspective state is a state 
that takes an assertoric attitude toward the content <I desire that I eat gelato>, 
which content deploys the concepts of self, desire, eating, and gelato and has the 
propositional structure aRb (where a is the concept of self, R is the concept of 
desire, and b is a structured composite of three concepts: self, eating, and 
gelato).  
The reason we focus on the thought-y nature of the second-order state in 
Rosenthal’s theory of consciousness and introspection is that in §2 we will argue 
for the psychological reality of an introspective phenomenon we call “primitive 
introspection” (Giustina 2018, 2019), which is not a thought: its content is not 
the kind of content that thoughts have. This will create a prima facie difficulty 
for Rosenthal’s theory of introspection. The purpose of §3 will then be to bring 
this prima facie difficulty nearer the status of an ultima facie argument against 
the theory. 
 
2. Reflective Introspection and Primitive Introspection  
 
Introspection is commonly characterized as a distinctively first-personal method 
of getting knowledge of one’s current phenomenally conscious states. By 
“distinctively first-personal” we mean that this method is available to the person 
whose phenomenal state is introspected in a way it is not to other persons. By 
“current” states, we mean states roughly simultaneous with the introspecting. As 
we have seen, Rosenthal’s account of introspecting takes it to be a thought, and 
therefore to display at least the following two features: (1) it is conceptual, which 
at a minimum means it involves the deployment of a mental representation that 
enables the subject to (a) distinguish Cs from non-Cs and (b) recognize token Cs 
as instances of the type C; (2) it is propositional, i.e. has a predicatively 
structured content which is made up of concepts. It follows that all introspection 
is classificatory: it involves classifying or recognizing what is introspected as an 
instance of a certain experience type.  
Of course, we do not deny the existence of an introspective phenomenon 
answering roughly to this characterization. On our view, however, there is also 
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another important introspective phenomenon. Beside this classificatory, thought-
like kind of introspection, which may be called “reflective introspection,” there is 
a kind of introspection that does not have the form of a thought; we call this 
“primitive introspection.” Primitive introspection is a kind of introspection of 
phenomenal states that does not involve classifying the introspected state as an 
instance of any state type.1 
Consider Sara’s gustatory experience when she tastes pistachio gelato. Sara 
has had pistachio gelato several times before, and thus knows what pistachio 
gelato tastes like and can recognize a pistachio-gelato taste experience when she 
has one. Accordingly, when she introspects her taste experience, Sara 
introspects it reflectively: she immediately classifies it as pistachio-gelato taste 
experience and thereby forms an introspective thought with a content roughly 
like <this is a pistachio-gelato taste experience> (or perhaps <I am having a 
pistachio-gelato taste experience>). Unlike Sara, however, Sam has never tasted 
pistachio gelato. When he tastes it for the first time, he is able of course to 
introspectively attend to his taste experience; but he is not able to classify it as 
pistachio-gelato taste experience, because he cannot recognize it as such. Now, it 
may be objected, correctly, that there are some introspective thoughts Sam can 
form about his experience—say, that it is a gelato-taste experience, or at the very 
least that it is a taste experience. But consider Sacha, whose rare condition has 
prevented him from having any taste experience until now. When a cure is 
mercifully found, Sacha’s first taste experience is pistachio gelato. Here there is 
no already-encountered experience type such that Sacha could classify his 
experience as an instance of it. Nevertheless, Sacha can still introspect his taste 
experience: he can become introspectively aware of his experience even though 
he cannot form any introspective thought about it. Sacha’s introspective state is 
what we call a state of primitive introspection. 
Sacha’s case may appear a bit far-fetched, but there are, arguably, at least 
three kinds of everyday-life case featuring primitive introspection. First, average 
humans do sometimes have categorically new experiences, which therefore they 
cannot quite classify: when one has an orgasm for the first time, say, one cannot 
recognize or classify it as an instance of a previously encountered experience 
type. Nevertheless, one can certainly attend to the experience and thereby 
introspect it. Second, there are cases where, although one could classify the 
experience, one chooses not to do so, as when one just wants to contemplate the 
 
1 The scope of such phenomenal-state introspection partly depends on what conscious states 
have phenomenology. Whereas for some conscious states (e.g. perceptual, algedonic, bodily) 
there is virtually unanimous agreement that they do have phenomenology, others (e.g. cognitive 
states) are object of controversy. We remain neutral on this and simply assume that whatever 
states have phenomenology, they are potential targets of primitive introspection. 
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phenomenology of one’s experience without attaching any judgment to it (some 
meditation practices claim to seek just such a contemplative introspective state). 
Third, even cases in which one does classify the introspected experience may 
nonetheless feature primitive introspection: they may be simply cases in which 
primitive introspection and reflective introspection co-occur. When we attend to 
a visual experience of an intricate mandala, the phenomenology of our 
experience is extremely rich and its fineness of grain is difficult (if not 
impossible) to capture by our classificatory abilities. Arguably, whatever 
introspective judgment we form about our visual experience, we also have a state 
of primitive introspection that captures the details of the phenomenology that go 
beyond what shows up in our introspective judgment. (For more on this, see 
Giustina 2018 Ch.1.) 
There are also theoretical considerations that support the psychological 
reality of primitive introspection. If we did not admit the existence of a non-
conceptual, non-classificatory kind of introspection, the acquisition of most 
phenomenal concepts (concepts associated with the phenomenology of 
experiences and deployed in introspective thoughts) would be mysterious. For 
how does one come to possess a phenomenal concept C? There seem to be only 
three options here: (i) C is acquired by introspection, (ii) C is acquired, but not 
through introspection, (iii) C is innate rather than acquired. Now, although 
options (ii) and (iii) may be viable for some phenomenal concepts, they surely are 
not viable for all or even most of them. 
Consider option (iii). Although many respectable theories posit a few innate 
concepts, the view that all or most phenomenal concepts are innate is hard to 
believe. For one thing, it entails that newborns possess mental representations 
that enable them to (a) discriminate a great number of experiences and (b) 
recognize each of them as an instance of a certain experience type. This seems 
quite implausible. Moreover, it would have the counterintuitive consequence that 
a newborn possesses, say, the phenomenal concept TRUMPET SOUND even if she 
has never heard any trumpet (indeed, even if she has never heard anything), or 
that she possesses the phenomenal concept PISTACHIO-GELATO TASTE before having 
tasted anything at all. In the same vein, a congenitally blind person would 
possess phenomenal concepts of color experiences, a congenitally deaf person 
would possess phenomenal concepts of sound experiences, and so on. All this is 
very hard to believe. 
As for option (ii), it is highly plausible that some phenomenal concepts are 
acquired otherwise than by introspection, notably through composition of other 
concepts. The phenomenal concept MILD PAIN, for instance, may well be built up 
from MILD and PAIN. Obviously, however, not all phenomenal concepts can be 
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formed compositionally, on pain of infinite regress. Some phenomenal concepts 
must be atomic or simple. Of these, some may still be non-introspectively 
acquired – perhaps through perception. Some philosophers hold that 
phenomenal concepts of perceptual experiences (PHENOMENAL-RED, PHENOMENAL-
SQUARE, etc.) are acquired by simply attending to the external object perceived, 
rather than by introspecting the relevant perceptual experience. However, for 
other kinds of experience, notably emotional and mood experiences, this is far 
less plausible. Even if fear involves representation of something as dangerous 
and fury involves representation of something as offensive, it does not seem 
possible to acquire the concepts of fear and fury merely by attending to 
dangerous and offensive things. Plausibly, the concepts we acquire by attending 
to dangerous and offensive things are precisely the concepts DANGEROUS and 
OFFENSIVE; but the concept FEAR is not identical to the concept DANGEROUS and 
the concept FURY is not the same as the concept OFFENSIVE. The concepts 
DANGEROUS and OFFENSIVE can be employed by someone completely incapable of 
experiencing fear and fury, but arguably such a person could not possess the 
phenomenal concepts FEAR and FURY. Accordingly, acquiring some phenomenal 
concepts clearly requires more than attending to the objects in one’s 
environment and their features: one needs to introspectively attend to one’s 
experience of these objects.  
We conclude that (i) must be true of some phenomenal concepts: some such 
concepts must be acquired through introspection. But if all introspection were 
conceptual, this would be impossible, on pain of circularity. Obviously, if a 
subject S’s having an introspective state φ depends on S’s deploying a previously 
possessed phenomenal concept C, C must be possessed by S prior to having φ 
and cannot itself be acquired by S through being in φ. (For a fuller development 
of this argument from concept acquisition, see Giustina 2019.) 
All these considerations, we suggest, speak up for the psychological reality 
of primitive introspection. If primitive introspection is real, now, then any 
adequate theory of introspection should be at least consistent with, and ideally 
account for, the existence of this kind of introspective state. In the next section, 
we argue that Rosenthal’s Third-Order Thought model of introspection does not 
have the resources to do so. Although the model is structurally fit to account for 
reflective introspection, it does not accommodate primitive introspection. 
 
3. Can the Third-Order Thought Model Accommodate Primitive 
Introspection? 
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The Third-Order Thought (TOT) model of introspection entails that all 
introspective states are thoughts. However, primitive-introspective states are not 
thoughts. Therefore, the TOT model seems unfit to capture primitive 
introspection. Our basic argument is this, then: 
(P1) There is a non-classificatory form of introspection. 
(P2) If all introspective states were second-order thoughts, then there would 
not be a non-classificatory form of introspection.  
(C) Not all introspective states are second-order thoughts. 
Support for (P1) comes from the arguments we outlined in §2. (P2) is a direct 
consequence of Rosenthal’s theory of introspection, as seen in §1. In what 
follows, we consider potential objections to (P1) and (P2) and argue that they can 
be rebutted. 
 
3.1. Defending (P1) 
Rosenthal might refuse to accept the very existence of primitive introspection, 
perhaps on the ground that (i) the crucial argument for the existence of primitive 
introspection is the argument from phenomenal-concept acquisition, and (ii) it 
can be resisted. 
Before considering (ii), note, in relation to (i), that in addition to the 
acquisition argument there is also important motivation for the psychological 
reality of primitive introspection that comes from reflection on examples and 
everyday-life cases. The argument from phenomenal-concept acquisition is 
meant to provide further theoretical support to that intuition-based claim. So 
while it would certainly weaken our case for primitive introspection, refuting the 
argument from phenomenal-concept acquisition would not utterly undermine it. 
One possible objection to the concept-acquisition argument is this. In 
defending the claim that some phenomenal concepts must be acquired through 
introspection, we have considered three alternatives: (a) that phenomenal 
concepts are innate, (b) that they are acquired through perception, and (c) that 
they are acquired through composition. However, we considered them only in 
isolation. We have not considered the possibility (d) that all phenomenal 
concepts are either innate or acquired through a combination of perception and 
composition. In particular, Rosenthal might propose the following view: there is 
only one innate phenomenal concept, namely the concept EXPERIENCE, and the 
other phenomenal concepts are acquired by composition of this concept and 
some perceptual concepts. The phenomenal concept FEAR, for instance, might be 
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acquired by combining EXPERIENCE with DANGEROUS (on the assumption that 
experiencing fear implies perception of danger)—plus, perhaps, some 
proprioceptive perceptual concepts of the kind of bodily changes that typically 
accompany fear experiences. Similarly, the phenomenal concept FURY might be 
acquired by combining EXPERIENCE with OFFENSIVE (plus fury-related bodily-
change concepts). No introspective state is involved in this acquisition process. 
The concepts DANGEROUS and OFFENSIVE are acquired through perception (as are 
the relevant bodily-change concepts), while the concept EXPERIENCE is not 
acquired at all. Therefore, we do not need to posit a non-conceptual kind of 
introspective state to explain the acquisition of either FEAR or FURY. And what is 
true of these two may be true of all phenomenal concepts (including those 
associated with emotions or moods). Call this the Hybrid Account of phenomenal-
concept acquisition. 
Our reply is twofold. On the one hand, the Hybrid Account does not seem to 
fit naturally in Rosenthal’s own view. On the other hand, the implausibility of 
some of its consequences gives a more general reason for finding the Hybrid 
Account unappealing. Let us consider these in turn. 
We doubt Rosenthal himself would plump for the Hybrid Account, for at 
least two reasons. First, the account seems in tension with his view about 
qualitative properties of experience and the way humans pick out and 
discriminate them. The Hybrid Account fits naturally in a “transparency” 
conception of conscious experience (Moore 1903; Harman 1990, 1996; Tye 
1995), on which we can be aware of properties of objects (e.g. the redness of a 
tomato), but not of properties of experiences (the reddish quality of an experience 
as of a red tomato). In such a framework, where introspective awareness never 
takes properties of experience as its object, but always “goes through” experience 
to what the experience represents, it is natural to explain the acquisition of 
phenomenal concepts along the lines of the Hybrid Account, i.e. by appeal to 
perception (awareness of objects and/or their properties) rather than 
introspection (intended as awareness of experiences and/or their properties). 
Rosenthal, however, rejects the transparency view. Against transparency 
theorists like Harman, he argues that properties of objects are not the only 
properties of which we can be aware: we can also, at least sometimes, be aware 
of the sensory or qualitative properties of experiences (Rosenthal 2000: 215-
216). To be sure, one may reject the strong transparency picture (and thereby 
allow for the possibility of introspective awareness of properties of experience), 
while endorsing the Hybrid Account of phenomenal-concept acquisition. 
However, arguably, this is not the way Rosenthal himself might want to go, for 
this seems to be in tension with his own view about the way we pick out and 
discriminate experience’s qualitative properties. He writes: 
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When we classify sensory states and discriminate among their various tokens, we 
appeal to what it is like for us to be in those states. This is equally so with bodily 
and perceptual sensations; we rely on such things as what it is like to be in pain, 
and what it is like to see red or hear a trumpet. (Rosenthal 1991: 19) 
Discriminating and classifying sensory states are functions carried out by 
phenomenal concepts. Arguably, appealing to what it is like for us to be in a 
certain state amounts to, or at least involves, introspecting the relevant state’s 
phenomenal properties. Accordingly, it seems that, on Rosenthal’s view, to 
acquire and deploy phenomenal concepts we need to be introspectively aware of 
phenomenal properties of our experiences– rather than perceptually aware of 
properties of the objects represented by those experiences. 
Second, the Hybrid Account, when combined with Rosenthal’s HOT theory of 
consciousness, has the implausible consequence that one cannot experience fear 
prior to a certain number of (fearless) episodes of awareness of danger. To see 
why this is a consequence, consider that on the Hybrid Account, the 
phenomenal concept FEAR can only be formed after having acquired the 
perceptual concept DANGEROUS. To acquire the latter, though, one presumably 
needs first to (seem to) perceive danger a number of times. Therefore, perceptual 
awareness of danger is always prior to the formation of the phenomenal concept 
FEAR. Now, on Rosenthal’s HOT theory, one can only have an experience of fear if 
one possesses the phenomenal concept FEAR (for the fear state is made conscious 
by a second-order thought that deploys that concept). By combining the Hybrid 
Account with Rosenthal’s HOT theory, then, we have that it is impossible to 
experience fear without first perceiving danger (fearlessly) a number of times. 
But this is implausible. It seems infants could experience fear before, or at least 
as soon as, they perceptually represent danger. An infant may have a first 
experience of fear (perhaps immediately after birth!) even if she has never 
perceptually represented anything as dangerous. More generally, it is 
implausible that for any emotional experience, one can only have it after one has 
had prior perceptual experiences of such high-order properties as being 
dangerous, being offensive, and so on. 
Beside its undesirable consequences for Rosenthal’s own version of the HOT 
theory, there is a more general reason to reject the Hybrid Account. If the Hybrid 
Account were true, having a perceptual experience of danger (plus some suitable 
bodily sensations) would be sufficient for one who has never experienced fear to 
simulate or imagine a fear experience (in another or in oneself). For to simulate 
that, say, the zebra is afraid of the lion, one has to possess the concept of fear 
and imaginatively apply it to the zebra. According to the Hybrid Account, 
possession of the concept of fear does not require actually experiencing fear. It 
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only requires innately possessing the concept of experience and having 
perceptual awareness of danger (and perhaps a few perceptual concepts 
associated with bodily changes). Thus a person who has never feared anything, 
but has undergone perceptual awareness of danger (and of certain bodily 
changes) would be able to “create” a new phenomenology in her mind—the 
emotional experience of fear—and to imaginatively apply it to someone else. This 
seems quite extraordinary. 
For all these reasons, we think the Hybrid Account is inherently problematic 
and anyway not a good ally for Rosenthal’s HOT theory (we doubt Rosenthal 
himself would be tempted by it). In addition, let us remind the reader that even if 
one accepted the Hybrid Account and concluded that primitive introspection 
need not play any role in phenomenal-concept acquisition, this would only 
deprive us of one theoretical reason for positing primitive introspection. It would 
not rule out primitive introspection’s existence, which, as noted above, is 
strongly motivated by further considerations. 
 
3.2. Defending (P2) 
The HOT theorist may acknowledge the existence of (a non-classificatory 
introspective phenomenon akin to) primitive introspection, but deny that the 
TOT model is inconsistent with it. She may argue that, even though it does not 
accommodate primitive introspection as characterized in §2 (i.e., as a non-
conceptual mental state), the TOT model can accommodate the existence of an 
introspective phenomenon which does not involve any classification or 
recognition of the introspected experience. What we have in mind are 
introspective thoughts that deploy demonstrative concepts, concepts such as 
THIS or THIS (KIND OF) EXPERIENCE, through which phenomenal characters can be 
picked out without quite being classified or even recognized. Appeal to such 
demonstrative concepts is made by conceptualists in other areas (McDowell 
1994: 56-7) and could be used by the conceptualist about introspection to 
capture the kind of introspective phenomenon we are interested in, where a 
token experience is represented without being typed. 
We find this approach more promising, but think it is ultimately not 
workable. Our argument against it is unfortunately not of the simplest kind—a 
trilemma nested inside a dilemma! At bottom, though, we will argue that the 
approach is ultimately forced into a completely implausible picture of the 
phenomenology of introspecting. 
 14 
To present our argument against the demonstrative approach, we will need 
a conception of the content of demonstrative introspective thoughts. Now, there 
are different views one might have on this. On the one end of the spectrum, it 
might be a highly articulated sort of content, perhaps something like <I am 
having this kind of experience>, where ‘this’ denotes the relevant determinate 
experience type. On the other end of the spectrum, the content might be rather 
minimalistic – something like <this is occurring>, where ‘this’ refers to the 
relevant token experience. In-between a number of other options may be 
envisaged. Obviously, the more articulated the content, the farther one drifts 
from the kind of introspective phenomenon we isolated in §2. If the content of 
the introspective thought is <I am having this kind of experience>, for instance, 
then it would appear one would need to deploy the concept of self, the concept of 
a kind, and the concept of experience. For this reason, we will suppose for the 
sake of exposition that the demonstrative introspective thought appealed to in 
the TOT model has the content <this is occurring>. This supposition is 
unnecessary for our argument and plays only an expository role. 
The problem for the TOT model is that it faces some uncomfortable choices 
with respect to the demonstrative concept THIS in <this is occurring>. In the TOT 
model we are considering, the first-order state M is made conscious by a second-
order thought with the content <this is occurring>, which is itself made 
conscious by a third-order thought, whose content is roughly <I think that this 
is occurring> (Figure 1). 
A first dilemma concerns whether THIS in <this is occurring> is a blind or a 
substantial demonstrative. A demonstrative is blind when it picks out its referent 
without carrying any information about it: it simply refers to ‘this thing I am 
ostending (or attending to), whatever it may be.’ A perceptual blind 
demonstrative, for instance, may be used by a subject who points blindly at a 
region of space before her, wondering what that is (Levine 2001: 82). Here the 
subject has no substantial conception of the referent of the demonstrative: no 
perceptual information about the referent is carried by the demonstrative—
Figure 1 
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simply because the subject does not perceive what the demonstrative denotes. 
When the subject opens her eyes, perceptual information can fill in the content 
of the demonstrative, which thereby becomes substantial. (Perhaps there is not a 
single demonstrative concept that first is blind and then becomes substantial. 
Perhaps it is rather that a blind demonstrative is replaced by a substantial 
demonstrative. This will make no difference to our argument.) A demonstrative is 
substantial, then, when it carries some information about its referent. 
Now, if there really are introspective blind demonstratives (not an 
uncontroversial issue: what would count as a “blind” mental pointing?), then the 
question arises whether THIS in <this is occurring> is blind or substantial. If it is 
blind, then the content of the demonstrative second-order thought amounts to 
something like <this (which I am mentally pointing at), whatever it may be, is 
occurring>. The demonstrative concept here denotes M (the first-order state, cf. 
Figure 1) without carrying any information about it. However, this is doubly 
problematic. First, this is manifestly not how introspection presents introspected 
experiences. When we introspect a pistachio-gelato experience, we are aware of 
some determinate qualities—that distinctive pistachio-y taste, for starters. 
Introspection does not present a ‘something, whatever it may be.’ Secondly, as we 
think of introspection (and as noted in §2), introspecting constitutes a kind of 
knowledge of the introspected. Arguably, this implies that, at the very least, 
through introspection one should get some information about the introspected 
mental state. But a thought featuring just a blind demonstrative and no 
substantial concept does not enable the subject to get any information about 
their current mental states. Therefore, it seems that, for the TOT model to do 
justice to the phenomenological reality and epistemic significance of 
introspection, some substantial concept must feature in the content of the 
second-order thought.2  
What, then, are the prospects for a TOT model that marshals a substantive 
concept in higher-order thoughts? Our basic reason for rejecting this approach 
is that it has no stable way of deciding whether the information carried by the 
demonstrative featuring in the second-order thought is phenomenal or non-
phenomenal. Phenomenal information is information about M’s phenomenology, 
that is, information about what it is like for the subject to be in M (e.g. 
 
2 It might be objected that primitive introspection, as characterized in §2, is 
threatened by a similar worry. How is a state that does not involve any concept 
supposed to provide one with knowledge? We only have the space here for gesturing 
toward the sketch of an answer. Roughly, the idea is that primitively introspecting 
constitutes a kind of knowledge that is non-propositional and non-conceptual—very 
akin to what Russell called “knowledge of things by acquaintance.” The existence 
and epistemic significance of this kind of knowledge has been defended by some 
contemporary epistemologists (e.g. Hofmann 2014 and Duncan 2018; see also 
Giustina 2018 Ch.6). 
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information about the reddish quality of one’s visual experience as of a red 
tomato, or about the unpleasant feeling that comes with pain experiences). Quite 
obviously, for S to get information about M’s phenomenology, M needs be 
phenomenally conscious: if M is unconscious, then there is nothing it is like for S 
to be in M and, a fortiori, S cannot get any information about the 
phenomenology of M. Non-phenomenal information is information about things 
other than M’s phenomenology: information about properties M has 
independently of its being phenomenally conscious. The question is whether the 
substantial THIS featuring in the second-order thought carries phenomenal 
information or only non-phenomenal information about M.  
Can the proponent of the TOT model construe the second-order THIS as 
carrying phenomenal information? This does not seem to fit the higher-order 
account of consciousness in the case of ordinary, non-introspective 
consciousness. In the non-introspective case, the second-order thought cannot 
carry information about phenomenal aspects of M, because M does not have 
phenomenal aspects independently of being higher-order thought of, in the first 
place. For the second-order thought to represent phenomenal properties of M, M 
would have to be phenomenally conscious. But the second-order thought is that 
in virtue of which M counts as conscious. The second-order thought cannot 
extract phenomenal information from M as long as M is not phenomenally 
conscious, and M is not phenomenally conscious until it is represented by the 
second-order thought, since the second-order thought is what makes M 
phenomenally conscious. It therefore seems that, at least in the non-
introspective case, the second-order THIS must carry non-phenomenal 
information about M—if it is to carry information about M at all. 
Can the TOT model construe THIS as carrying non-phenomenal 
information, then? Unfortunately, that does not seem to work in the case of 
introspective consciousness. Quite trivially, introspective states present 
phenomenal aspects of the introspected experiences. In the introspective case, 
then, the second-order thought—if that is what the introspective state is to be 
modeled as—represents some phenomenal properties of M. Therefore, plausibly, 
when the second-order thought <this is occurring> is conscious, the THIS carries 
phenomenal information about M. 
Might the TOT model construe the relevant THIS as carrying phenomenal 
information in introspective cases and non-phenomenal information in non-
introspective cases? This is coherent, of course, but has highly undesirable 
consequences. The content of the second-order thought <this is occurring> is 
partly determined by whether THIS carries phenomenal or non-phenomenal 
information. On the plausible assumption that concepts individuate sensitively 
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to the kind of information they carry, two demonstrative concepts THISP and THISN 
that co-refer to M are different if the former carries phenomenal information 
about M but the latter carries non-phenomenal information about M. 
Accordingly, two thoughts featuring THISP and THISN respectively would have 
different contents and thereby be different thoughts (since thoughts are 
individuated by their content). If the second-order thought features THISN in the 
non-introspective case (when the second-order thought is unconscious) but 
features THISP in the introspective case (when it is conscious), then in becoming 
conscious the second-order thought undergoes an intrinsic change. That is, the 
occurrence of the third-order thought changes the second-order thought—it does 
something to it—where the relevant change is not a mere Cambridge change, but 
a change in intrinsic properties. However, as noted, on the HOT theory, a mental 
state does not undergo any intrinsic change when it becomes conscious. It is 
essential to the theory’s reductive ambitions, we noted, that a mental state is 
intrinsically the same when it is unconscious and when it is conscious. 
If all this is right, then the TOT model faces a destructive trilemma when it 
tries to account for primitive introspection by incorporating a substantial 
demonstrative THIS into the second-order thought <this is occurring>. Either (1) 
the demonstrative always carries non-phenomenal information, or (2) it always 
carries phenomenal information, or (3) it carries non-phenomenal information 
when the second-order thought is unconscious (in the non-introspective case) 
and phenomenal information when it is conscious (in the introspective case). 
Each of these options, we have seen, has implausible or undesirable 
consequences. If (1) the demonstrative always carries non-phenomenal 
information, then the content of the second-order thought fits well with non-
introspective cases but not in introspective cases. (1) has the implausible 
consequence that non-classificatory introspective states never represent the 
phenomenal properties of introspected states. If instead (2) the demonstrative 
always carries phenomenal information about M, then introspective cases are 
accommodated but non-introspective cases are not. (2) poses a circularity threat: 
if the second-order thought carries information about the phenomenology of M, 
then M needs have a phenomenology prior to the formation of the second-order 
thought, but on the HOT theory the second-order thought is exactly what gives 
M its phenomenology. As for option (3), it forces a radical revision of the HOT 
theory of consciousness. As noted in §1, on Rosenthal’s view consciousness is a 
relational property, not an intrinsic property. Accordingly, when a higher-order 
thought makes a lower-order thought conscious, it does not cause a change in 
M’s intrinsic properties. Consciousness is not an intrinsic property of M caused 
by the higher-order thought. Rather, it is a relational property constituted by the 
presence of the higher-order thought directed at the lower-order state. On a 
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standard HOT theory, this is the case regardless of what “level” the higher-order 
and lower-order states are in. However, in endorsing option (3), the HOT theorist 
would reach the view that although a second-order thought does not change the 
lower-order state it makes conscious, a third-order thought does change the 
lower-order thought it makes conscious. In other words, although first-order 
states do not undergo an intrinsic change when they become conscious, second-
order states do. The result would be a consistent but odd and unstable theory, 
according to which consciousness is a relational property of first-order states but 
an intrinsic property of second-order states. 
This concludes our argument against the attempt to recover primitive 
introspection within a Rosenthal-style TOT model of introspection by adverting 
to demonstrative higher-order thought. As promised, the argument is a simple 
trilemma-nested-inside-a-dilemma. The structure of the argument is depicted in 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 
If the TOT model of introspection cannot accommodate primitive introspection, 
its only option is to deny the existence of primitive introspection. As we have 
argued, however, the psychological reality of primitive introspection is both 
manifest in everyday-life cases and theoretically indispensable in explaining the 
acquisition of phenomenal concepts. So, even if one accepted David Rosenthal’s 
theory of introspection as an account of reflective introspection, the theory would 
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still require supplementation in the form of an account of primitive 
introspection.3 
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